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D I S C U S S I O N

DISCUSSION

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Unique Problems of Covert Operations.

1. The covert operational field is so shrouded in cloak and dagger atmosphere and American experience is so limited that certain half-truths and false assumptions have become accepted as facts. The history of American ^{assumptions?} (participation) in this field during and since World War II is replete with examples of confusion, frustration, inefficiency, insecurity and incompetence. The situation can be improved materially by providing personnel at all echelons with sufficient background information and training to enable them to cope with the peculiar problems incident to covert operations.

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2. Before a student pilot is permitted to solo, he spends hundreds of hours in ground school learning basic principles, techniques and flight characteristics. He learns how much runway is required to gain flying speed for take-off -- and thousands of other items of pertinent technical data. It should be recognized that running ^(or producing material estimates) covert agents is just as complex as flying aircraft. A medical student takes years to become a doctor -- and still longer to become a surgeon. It surely requires more

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training, skill, experience and judgment to operate successfully against a body politic than to remove bombs. Regardless of the degree of specialized skill which a person may bring from his previous vocation, he must receive proper orientation to adapt his knowledge and experience to this peculiar field of activity. Both operators and administrators must receive enough training to understand the complex nature and full scope of their respective responsibilities. The following basic concepts illustrate the vast differences between covert operations and normal activities:




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a. In covert operations, every possible effort must be made to increase impact at the point of operation since that is the payoff.



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b. Unlike most other types of activity, it is impossible to provide direct support or supervision at the point of operation.

c. Action at the point of operation is usually



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pay and sever relations with a covert agent than a staff employee.

e. Since covert operations have such a highly explosive potential (for good or bad) it is unjustifiable to undertake operational commitments unless operational capabilities can be provided on schedule.

f. Since covert operations are so difficult and involve the taking of calculated risks, better planning and more adequate support are required to obtain an acceptable degree of success.

B. Training Requirements. Abraham Lincoln once said, "If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better know what to do and how to do it." That sage comment is particularly applicable to the present state of operational training. The following paragraphs highlight some of the problems which require further research and analysis in order to take effective action:



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[] As yet no precise determination has been made regarding the extent of CIA responsibilities in several of the covert program fields, either in all-out cold war or total war. Until these facts are determined, it will be impossible for training to make adequate preparation to serve the operating mission.

2. Magnitude. The comments in regard to mission are equally applicable to magnitude. It is necessary to obtain a reasonably clear and accurate indication of both the nature and extent of covert activities in order for training to make adequate preparations. In the meantime, it would be prudent to move forward immediately on the basis of a conservative estimate of proposed expansion based on the levels of activity reflected in the revised FY 1952 budget estimates which were approved by the Director.

3. Policy and Doctrine. In a recent analysis, the Training Division staff reported that the training courses in the various program fields other than secret intelligence and counter-espionage did not meet acceptable standards. One of the important contributing factors is that the Training Division has thus far been unable to obtain substantive policy and program doctrine in these special fields. This obviously becomes the responsibility of the

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covert office and, until such action is taken, the training staff cannot prepare training doctrine or manuals. Increased emphasis should be placed on this project to enable the Training Division to provide effective training in these operational fields.

4. Position Analysis. Due to limited staff and facilities, there has been a tendency to operate training without adequate regard for the peculiar needs of the individual student. There is a conflict between the effort to provide mass training for the sake of economy and the need for individual training to meet particular requirements. This conflict is aggravated because the positions in the covert offices have not been analyzed in a manner which would determine -- first, the functions; and second, the training requirements of the various positions. The following tentative breakdown indicates the type of positions that should be analyzed to determine the minimum skill or information required to discharge functional responsibilities:

a. Overseas Generalists



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
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b. Headquarters Generalists


- (1) Division Chiefs
- (2) Branch Chiefs

c. Program Specialists



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d. Operational and Support Specialists



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5. Flexible Packaging. The tendency to arrange training to meet the convenience of the Training Division rather than the operational requirements of the students has not insured optimum utilization of training facilities or instructional time. The training program has been offered in units of such size that it is difficult to select the particular portion most urgently needed and to eliminate other phases

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9. On-the-job Training. Only a small percentage of the people now working in OFC have had any previous experience or training in this field of activity. A substantial portion of the current difficulties are caused by failure of the incumbent to perform the essential functions of his position. The urgency and pressure that made it appear advisable to place a raw recruit in his permanent assignment without adequate training may still exist. It therefore becomes necessary to devise an effective system of in-service or on-the-job training which will provide an effective solution to this serious problem. If the training programs were arranged in flexible packages of approximately 40 hours each, it would be possible to schedule them at fixed periods during the day so that a student could attend on a part-time basis

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in the same manner that the rapid reading course is being conducted. In view of the large number of untrained and inexperienced people and the urgency of the situation (particularly with regard to case officers) special lecture courses should be devised for this specific purpose which would recognize that students were already on the job and would thus combine the formal lecture method with the actual in-service experience.

10. External Training Facilities. As the rate of expansion approaches that reflected in the FY 1952 budget estimates, it will be imperative to utilize all the methods suggested previously and to exploit external training facilities to the optimum degree. External training facilities should include appropriate

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
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external facilities -- for example, the Air Force sends students to Georgetown for advanced degrees in psychological warfare, to Harvard for business administration, and to many other institutions for special fields of activity. If the military find these external facilities practical, it would seem even more important for a small agency such as CIA to use them.

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12. Training Aids. During the later days of OSS, several excellent training films were prepared which are still being used by the Training Division. These have been supplemented by commercial-type films which have marginal value for training purposes. During and since the war,

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there have been rapid strides in the development of audio-visual, electronic, and other types of training aids. This area merits greater research, development and application to the peculiar problems of operational training.

C. Organization and Control.

1. In order for the covert offices to satisfy their unusual training requirements with an acceptable degree of security and efficiency, they must maintain an appropriate degree of policy and operational control over their ^{equipment?} training facilities. This premise is not incompatible with the concept under which the Director established a Director of Training for the Agency, provided that appropriate care is taken to protect and maintain relationships that are desirable for operational effectiveness as outlined in the following paragraphs of this section. Several features which have been incorporated to meet current conditions might require modification in the event of a merger of GSO and OFC. The proposed organization would accomplish the following:

- ✓ a. Insure an appropriate degree of policy and operational control by the covert offices.

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✓ b. Provide an appropriate degree of administrative and operational autonomy with unified command.

c. Enable the Director of Training and the service units of CIA to provide optimum support, assistance and staff supervision.

d. Provide a method and mechanism for resolving conflicting interests or competitive requirements and establishing equitable priorities.

e. Establish a competent task force to maintain continuing research and development on operational training problems.

2. Operational Training Command (or Service). The present Training Division has three types of personnel (TRD, OSO and OFC) subject to various personnel standards and procedures. It receives budgetary and most administrative support through OSO. Other types of support are usually received direct from the (service units) of CIA with an occasional "assist" from OSO or OFC. In theory (by courtesy of OSO) TRD received unified policy and operational guidance through the Joint Training Committee, but this weak and poorly organized mechanism was disregarded in several instances on major policy questions. Since the

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
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Director has now placed TTD under the supervision of the Director of Training, many of the weaknesses of the previous system could be corrected and more adequate administration and support could be provided through the establishment of a semi-autonomous Operational Training Command (or Service) which would have its own budget and T/C. This suggestion presupposes that there would also be an Intelligence Training Command (or Service) and a Support Training Command (or Service) under the supervision of the Director of Training to serve other Offices of the Agency. (See explanatory chart on next page.)

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CHART OF CIA TRAINING ORGANIZATION
(Outlined in Paragraphs C - 2, 3, 4)



- * Proposed new units
(1) Reorganized Joint Training Committee
(2) Reorganized Training Division

Note: The Operational Training Command would be designed primarily to meet the needs of OSO and OFC, but these Offices would also use the other training facilities as necessary or desirable.

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